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Intergenerational Mobility of Immigrants in Germany: 
Moving with Natives or Stuck in their Neighborhoods?
* 
 
In this paper, I analyze intergenerational mobility of immigrants and natives in Germany. 
Using the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), I find intergenerational elasticities that 
range from 0.19 to 0.26 for natives and from 0.37 to 0.40 for immigrants. These elasticity 
estimates are lower than typically found for the U.S. and imply higher mobility in Germany 
than in the U.S. However, as in the U.S., I find greater mobility among German natives than 
among immigrants. Moreover, I investigate to what extent the lower mobility among 
immigrants in Germany is due to “ethnic capital” as suggested by Borjas (1992). I find that 
the impact of father’s earnings on son’s earnings remains virtually unchanged when including 
a measure of ethnic capital, suggesting that the higher father-son correlation found among 
immigrants is not due to omitting ethnic capital. However, I do find a large independent effect 
of ethnic capital on sons’ earnings (the coefficient is 0.81 as opposed to 0.25 found by Borjas 
(1992)). These results are consistent with estimates from Microcensus data, where the 
combined effect of parents’ and ethnic capital is close to unity. Thus, contrary to the U.S. 
results which suggest convergence of immigrants’ earnings towards natives’ earnings, the 
German results suggest divergence of immigrant earnings. 
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  From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, immigrant inflows increased dramatically 
in OECD countries (OECD (1999a)).  Immigration into Germany began during the 1960s 
and the 1970s when Germany invited approximately 3 million “guest workers” from 
southern Europe (Spain, Italy, and Greece), the former Yugoslavia and from Turkey.  
More recently, 2.5 million people from Eastern Europe moved to unified Germany since 
reunification occurred 15 years ago. As a result of these earlier and more recent inflows, 
children of immigrants now constitute 10 percent of the young population in Germany. 
An important question is whether this second generation has been able to integrate 
rapidly into the native population or whether they have inherited the disadvantages faced 
by the first generation of immigrants.               
Immigrant assimilation has been much less studied in Europe than in the U.S. - 
partly because immigration has a much shorter (modern) history in Europe. Important 
institutional differences in the labor market, in the tax system, in the education system as 
well as the role of the family in the transmission of human capital between generations, 
suggest that there might be important differences in the possibilities of reaching long-
term assimilation between the U.S. and Europe.  The main objective of this paper is to 
analyze intergenerational mobility of immigrants and natives in Germany. A large 
literature has developed in the late 1980s and the first half of 1990s concerning the 
correlation of economic status across generations in the United States. However, there 
has been much less research about the intergenerational mobility in Germany, and no 
papers have investigated the importance of ethnic capital in Germany.  Borjas (1992) lays 
  2out a framework in which “ethnic capital,” the average human capital level of the ethnic 
group in the father’s generation, has an external effect on the human capital investment in 
the son’s generation.  In this paper I examine the importance of ethnic capital in Germany 
using two alternative methods. First, I examine the impact of father’s income and the 
average income of father’s ethnic group and cohort on son’s income using the data from 
the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP). I supplement this analysis with 
Microcensus using the between-group methods used by Borjas (1993) and Card, 
DiNardo, and Estes (2000). To preview my main results, I find that the intergenerational 
elasticity of son’s income with respect to father’s income ranges from 0.19 to 0.26 for 
natives and from 0.37 to 0.40 for immigrants.   On their own, these results would suggest 
greater mobility in Germany than in the U.S.  However, I also find a large effect of ethnic 
capital, which contributes to generate a lot of persistence in earnings among immigrants 
in Germany.  When the ethnic capital variable is included in the father-son regression, the 
coefficient on father’s income remains virtually unchanged while the coefficient on the 
ethnic capital is significant and large, ranging from 0.62 to 0.82.  These results are 
consistent with estimates from Microcensus data, where the combined effect of parents’ 
and ethnic capital is close to unity.  Consequently, including ethnic capital is very 
important.  Contrary to the results which only include father’s income, the results that 
include ethnic capital suggest much less mobility for immigrants in Germany than for 
immigrants in the U.S. 
             The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews 
previous papers. Section 3 describes the main empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the 
data.  Section 5 presents the main results on the elasticity of son’s income with respect to 
  3father’s income for natives and immigrants as well as the results on ethnic capital. 
Section 6 investigates possible channels of the intergenerational transmission of status by 
examining education, occupation, as well as before and after-tax family income.  Section 
7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
               The  concept  of  the  intergenerational  mobility  has  been  on  the  agenda  of 
researchers since the publication of well-known pioneering study by Becker and Tomes 
(1979, 1986), which introduced the theory of the intergenerational mobility for the first 
time. Following this paper, an extensive literature emerged trying to quantify the extent 
of intergenerational mobility. Most of the earlier studies used cross sectional data for a 
single year. Thus, these suffer from measurement error in income and it is also the case 
that income from a single year may be largely driven by transitory shocks. For this 
reason, later studies have relied on panel data and have relied on instrumental variables to 
get at the impact of the father’s permanent income on children’s income. These later 
studies show much lower mobility than the earlier studies suggested. Solon (1989, 1992), 
Zimmerman (1992), Björklund and Jäntti (1997), Couch and Dunn (1997), Mulligan 
(2001), Grawe (2004) examine the income elasticity between generations and find that 
the intergenerational elasticity and correlation in long-run income is around 0.4 for US-
born males. These results suggest that a grandchild is 16% as likely to have the same 
income as their grandfather, while the earlier studies suggested that a grandchild was only 
4% as likely to have the same income as his grandfather. 
  4              While a handful of studies examine the degree of intergenerational mobility for 
the US-born males, few studies have attempted to investigate the intergenerational 
transmission of immigrants. Borjas(1992,1994) states that the process of 
intergenerational mobility of immigrants may differ from that of the natives. It is likely 
that the immigrant children are exposed to the culture, attitudes, language of their ethnic 
groups and, therefore the ethnic environment of the parent generation might be crucial in 
explaining the degree of intergenerational mobility. Borjas defines this concept as “ethnic 
capital”. More recently, a study by Card, DiNardo and Estes (2000) uses US census data 
to study the mobility of immigrants across various over generations and finds that the 
intergenerational mobility is greater for immigrants than that for natives among both the 
younger and older cohorts.  
              While an extensive literature has developed on the extent of the intergenerational 
mobility for the US, relatively little is known regarding the intergenerational transmission 
for natives and immigrants in other major industrialized countries. A handful of studies 
have addressed the degree of intergenerational mobility in Scandinavian countries, 
including Osteberg (2000) for Sweden, Bratberg at al. (2003) for Norway, Österbacka 
(2003) for Finland. Overall, these studies suggest that the Scandinavian countries are 
more mobile than the U.S. Likewise, the study by Daerden et al. about UK and other two 
studies by Corak (2004) and Grawe (2004) about Canada suggest more mobility in terms 
of socioeconomic status in the U.K. and Canada than in the U.S. 
               In spite of extensive immigration in the 1960’s and 1970s and the more recent 
immigration in the 1990s into Germany, few studies have attempted to investigate the 
process by which the intergenerational mobility takes place in this country. The study by 
  5Couch and Dunn (1997) is the first to examine the correlation between the labor market 
outcomes of a child and his or her parent for German natives. This study offers a direct 
comparison between US and Germany using the same estimation technique on similar 
samples drawn from panel data sets covering the same multiyear time period. Contrary to 
studies for other industrialized countries which suggest more mobility in these countries 
than in the U.S., the empirical analysis suggests that children in Germany are as likely as 
their U.S. counterparts to inherit the economic and social status of their parent. Similarly, 
two other studies by Lillard (2001) and Grawe (2004) find using GSOEP that the 
intergenerational mobility in Germany is around 0.10.  However, these studies are subject 
to a number of problems.  First, the studies fail to consider parents and children at similar 
stages in their life-cycles, which would bias results towards greater mobility as children 
of poor parents will be already employed and children of wealthy parents will likely still 
be doing internships and taking their first jobs after completing University degrees.   
Second, because these studies do not consider natives and immigrants separately, they 
ignore the potential role of ethnic capital and are likely to overestimate the extent of 
mobility.   
 
  3. Estimation Strategy 
 
3.a.. Effect of Parental Capital 
              In  this  section,  I  lay  out  the  basic  framework  used  by  Solon  (1992)  and 
Zimmerman (1992) to estimate the effect of father’s long run income on son’s long-run 
income.  Let Y1i will be the long-run economic status (income) for a son in family i, and 
  6let Y0i be the same variable for his father. Then, intergenerational income mobility can be 
estimated by applying least squares to the regression equation 
(1)                                                        Y1i= α+βY0i+ε1i     
where α is the average adult income of the son’s generation, Y0i is average income of the 
father’s generation , ε1i is an error term assumed to be white noise.   
              The average income of a generation may evolve through time. For example, it 
may be that many or all members of a generation will have incomes higher than what 
their parents had at a similar age in the past. Just as importantly, equation (1) reflects the 
idea that individual’s income is nonetheless related to his or her parents’ income. The 
coefficient β measures the degree of persistence or immobility in the society and is the 
fraction of the father’s relative position that his son inherits. If income is in logarithms, 
then β is the elasticity of son’s long run income to father’s long run income. Estimates of  
β close to unity point to high persistence and limited mobility whereas values of β close 
to zero indicate low persistence and close to complete intergenerational mobility.   
Presumably, any real number could be obtained from the estimation of equation (1); a 
negative value of β would refer to a situation where parents are high in their distribution 
of income, while their children tend to be low in their own generations’ income 
distribution. Although most empirical studies investigate the intergenerational mobility 
between fathers and sons and find β to lie between zero and one, some studies that 
explore the mobility between father-daughter and mother-daughter pairs have found 
negative estimates of β.             
  7             Previous  estimates  of  intergenerational  mobility  obtained  by  applying  least 
squares to equation (1) have been criticized for several reasons.
2 First, they did not use 
long-run income but instead used single-year measures of earnings or income. Second, 
many previous studies used homogenous and unrepresentative samples. These problems 
generated downward biases in the estimated intergenerational elasticity.  Solon (1992) 
and Zimmerman (1992) offer various solutions which I adopt in this paper.  Equation (1) 
specifies a relationship between long-run or permanent incomes of fathers and sons 
which are not observed. The current income, Yit, of the father or son can be modeled as 
consisting of three components as in the following  
     (2)                              Yit = Yi+ γ Xit + vit
where Yi  measures permanent income,  Xit  is a set of factors which cause current income 
to deviate from permanent income such as age and year indicators,  and vit  is a transitory 
error component.
3 Estimation of equation (1) with “adjusted status” yields a biased 
estimate of intergenerational mobility parameter β. If least squares estimation is applied, 
then  β will be downwardly biased. In particular, if all error components of both 
generations’ transitory status, permanent status, and age are uncorrelated with and within 
each other, then the probability limit of the estimated slope coefficient, shown in (3), is 
the bias arising from the classical errors in variable problem:  
(3)                               Plim β hat= β [σy
2 / (σy
2+σv0
2)] < β 
The magnitude of this bias depends on the ratio of signal to total variance, 
                                                 
2 Hauser, Sewell, and Lutterman (1975); Atkinson(1981); Behrman and Taubman(1983) 
3 Following Zimmerman (1992), I estimate equation (1) in two steps. I first regress log income on age, age 
squared, and year dummies for fathers and sons separately and construct residuals which I refer to as 





2 is the variance of father’s long-run status, and σv0
2 is the 
variance of father’s transitory status.  Like most recent studies, I decrease this bias by 
taking averages of income over multiples years. Applying least square estimation and 
assuming the errors are uncorrelated over time would yield an estimate of β with 
probability limit  







where T is the number of years. As T increases, the bias decreases.          
  However, as Zimmerman (1992) shows, the assumption that the transitory 
components of current income are uncorrelated over time may be too strong an 
assumption and can be relaxed by using cross-sectional variation in earnings. If the 
transitory component of fathers’ earnings followed AR (1), i.e. v0it = ρv0it-1+ ξit, then plim 




2)) {1+2ρ [T-(1- ρ
t)/(1- ρ)]/T(1- 
ρ)} in equation (3).  Following this method, I assume that both fathers’ and sons’ 
transitory error components follow AR (1) process. Also, I average multiple years of 
income to address serial correlation in the vit ‘s.  
  Estimates of permanent earnings will suffer from measurement error if the 
sample contains individuals who have reported earnings only for a small number of years. 
To eliminate this problem, Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) include only individuals 
who were fully employed in all years. In this paper, I compare the results from using 
individuals who have income at least one year to those using multiple years. 
              Haider and Solon (2005) show that any regression model that uses annual 
earnings as a proxy for life-time earnings may give biased estimates if there is earnings 
growth rate heterogeneity. Their empirical analysis shows that the standard assumption of 
  9the classical errors-in-variables is well founded if sons’ earnings are measured between 
their early thirties and mid-forties. Previous studies of intergenerational mobility in 
Germany are likely to suffer from this problem since the average age sons used are in the 
twenties.  Since the sons in my sample are on average in their mid-thirties, this is less 
likely to be a concern in this study. 
 
3.b. Effect of Ethnic Capital 
              The  intergenerational  transmissions among immigrants may work through at 
least two different channels: the direct effect from parents (”parental capital”), the effect 
of the ethnic group (”ethnic capital” or ”neighborhood effect”).  Borjas (1992, 1993) 
points out that the estimate of the intergenerational elasticity, β, may be biased upwards 
for immigrants if the average socio-economic status measure  of the father’s ethnic group 
and cohort is correlated with the father’s own socio-economic status and if the average 
value of the father’s ethnic group plays a role in determining the long-run status of 
children. Adding the ethnic variable effect to equation (1), we now have: 
(5)                                Y 1,i,j= α + β1 Y 0,i,j+ β2 Y 0,j +εi     
where Y 1,i,j  represents income of the son from family i, nationality j, and Y 0,i,j  represents 
the income of the father from family i, nationality j, and Y 0,j represents the average 
incomes of fathers from the same country of origin. The coefficient β2 capture the impact 
of the ethnic spillover. With ethnic capital, the degree of persistence can be measured by 
the sum of coefficients β1+  β2. The degree of persistence may be substantially 
underestimated by taking account of only parental capital and by ignoring ethnic capital.  
The combined effect, β1+  β2, can also be estimated using Census data following the 
  10methods used by Borjas (1992, 1993, and 1994). While father-son pairs cannot be 
identified in census data, under the appropriate assumptions, we can estimate the 
persistence rate as the combined effect as in the following 
(6)                               Y 1,j= α + (β1+ β2) Y 0,j +εi     
 
Y  1,j   represents the average earnings of sons from the same nationality, and Y 0,j   
represents the average earnings of fathers from the same country of origin. The 
transmission parameter describing how the mean skills of the ethnic group evolve across 
generations is given by the sum of coefficients, β1+ β2. 
 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics   
  In this paper I rely on two sources of data to analyze native and immigrant 
mobility in Germany.  First, I use the German Socio-Economic Panel, which has data on 
both native and immigrant parents and their children and which allows to separately 
analyze the impact of parents’ socio-economic status and the impact of ethnic socio-
economic status on children.  Then, I turn to German Census to examine the joint effect 
of parents’ and ethnic socio-economic status on immigrants using data from a larger 
dataset.  In turn, I describe each of these datasets. 
 
4.a. German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP)               
              The  bulk  of  my  empirical analysis uses nationally representative data 
from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP)
4. The most important feature of this 
                                                 
4 Information on data sources and extracts is provided in the data appendix. 
  11dataset in my context is that it over-samples foreigners and also provides information on 
their pre-immigration profiles as well as their own education and their parents’.   
 For this study, I only use the data for fathers from the former West Germany and 
their sons. The main reason for this choice of sample is that there are large differences in 
socio-economic differences between the former West Germany and East Germany in 
terms of economic environment, career opportunities, the education system as well as 
basic vocational training opportunities. Besides, the vast majority of the guest workers 
were invited by the government of former West Germany. Since then, these guest 
workers have been working in different sectors in the former West Germany. In addition, 
their children attended schools in the former West Germany and also work in West 
Germany. For this reason, it seems reasonable to compare the intergenerational mobility 
of natives and these guest workers who live in West Germany.   
              As a final point, family, individual and relationship identifiers in the GSOEP 
allow us to match sons and fathers. I construct a sample of father-son pairs for both 
immigrants and natives. I define first generation immigrants (fathers) as those who 
immigrated to Germany regardless of the age of arrival. Additionally, I identify second 
generation immigrants (sons) to be individuals who were either born in Germany or who 
migrated to Germany before 6 years of age and who are not German nationals.  
               My analysis is primarily conducted using 647 father-son pairs for natives and 
269 for immigrants. I include all fathers who had full-time employment in any year 
between 1984 and 1989 and all sons whose father was in the GSOEP and who had full-
time employment in any year between 2000 and 2004. I exclude observations during any 
  12year in which the son was enrolled in school or the parent to whom he or she is matched 
was enrolled in school or retired. 
               Table  1  provides  the  descriptive statistics for father-son pairs which are 
computed for natives and immigrants separately. The average father’s age is 44.6 for 
natives and 45.8 for immigrants in 1984, and the average son’s age is 30.8 for natives and 
30.9 for immigrants in 2004. Our education measure is the highest number of completed 
years of schooling reported in the interval from 1984 to 1989 for fathers and from 2000 to 
2004 for sons. The average education of native fathers is 11.4 and it is almost 2.5 years 
higher than the immigrant fathers’. On the other hand, native sons’ highest-grade 
increases by only 1 year relative to their fathers’, while for immigrant sons years of 
education increased by 1.8 years on average relative to their fathers’. A comparison of 
mean education of native and immigrant fathers and sons, thus suggests convergence of 
immigrants in terms of their educational attainment.   
              From Table 1, (log) annual labor earning of immigrant fathers is less than that of 
natives for all years although average earning of immigrant sons is similar to the earnings 
of native sons. The annual labor earnings examined in Table 1 include wages and salary 
from all employment plus income from bonuses. All nominal values of annual labor 
income are deflated using the German consumer price index. While previous studies for 
Germany study intergenerational mobility using current monthly income instead of 
annual earnings, current monthly income is a noisier measure of permanent income. 
Moreover, using annual earnings, as described detailed in Appendix, seems particularly 
important for white collar workers, who are most likely to earn additional bonuses. Table 
1 show that the earnings of native sons are 14% lower than those of their fathers’, while 
  13the earnings of immigrant sons are only 1% lower than their fathers’.  While sons and 
parents are at different stages of their life-cycles and it is important to make age 
adjustments that account for this, comparisons of mean earnings of fathers and sons 
suggest that immigrant sons are catching up more quickly with the earnings parents than 
native sons. 
              Table 2 shows the distribution of fathers by number of sons. Since, some fathers 
have more than one son in the labor force; we have 518 native fathers corresponding to 
647 native sons and 207 immigrant fathers corresponding to 269 immigrant sons. Table 2 
indicates that 79% of the native fathers have one son, 18% of them have 2 sons and only 
3% of them have more than two sons.  Similarly, 78% of the immigrant fathers have only 
one son, 18% of them have 2 sons and almost 4% of them have more than two sons. 
              I implement the empirical strategy using the total number of years for fathers (6 
years between 1984 and 1989 and sons (5 years between 2000 and 2004) when they may 
report positive annual labor income. Table 3 shows information on the number of years 
that the fathers and sons have positive annual labor income. Using a sample of son-father 
pairs, Table 3 suggests that a vast majority of native and immigrant fathers have positive 
annual labor income for all 6 years (92% of native-born fathers and 88% of foreign-born 
fathers); whereas it appears that only 43% of the native sons and 34% of immigrant sons 
have positive annual labor income for all 5 years. This evidence is reasonable since it is 
possibly that some of the sons are unemployment for young people are high in Germany. 
Additionally, Table 3 points out that the percentage of immigrant sons with one or two 
years of positive income is higher than native sons with same years of information, where 
  14the corresponding numbers are 37% and 27% for immigrant sons and native sons, 
respectively. 
 
4.b. Micro Census Data 
              The Microcensus Scientific Use File
5 enables me to include children that are 
residing in the same household with their parents. In this paper, I mainly use fathers who 
have children between 5 and 18 years old those living in the same household between 
1989 and 1991. Additionally, I construct the sons sample by using individuals who are 
between 20 and 33 years old between 2000 and 2004. Therefore, I claim that these sons 
are most probably the sons of the fathers’ sample that I obtain for 1989 to 1991. This 
assumption seems plausible; hence it appears that more than 90% of children under 18 
years of age are residing in the same household with their parents
6.  
              A drawback from the Census is that it is not possible to identify the nationality 
of approximately 50,000 people residing in the Federal Republic of Germany. These 
people are referred as “others” in the Census data, thus we can not distinguish their 
nationalities. Fortunately, the faction of that group is less than 1% of those with 
nationalities other than German and we can successfully identify 20 countries in the 1989 
and 1991 censuses. 
Table 4.a. decomposes the characteristics of native and immigrant men by 
whether individuals have children; have children between 5 and 18 years of age or do not 
have child at all. Additionally, Table 4.b. presents the summary statistics for the second 
generation immigrants and their native counterparts by different age ranges. It appears 
                                                 
5 Information on data sources and extracts is provided in the data appendix. 
6 Source: Schimpl -Neimanns (2002:7) 
  15that native and immigrant fathers with children and with children between 5 and 18 years 
of age have similar average age, whereas both native and immigrant men without any 
child are older.  
Unfortunately, Microcensus data does not contain information regarding wages of 
the individuals; instead it has information concerning “main source of income”. I identify 
full-time workers as those who report the employment earnings as the main source of 
income and work at least 30 weeks per year and 30 hours per week like in Zimmerman 
(1992) and I use the income information for these individuals as a proxy for their 
earnings. An additional concern is that income information is reported in intervals in the 
Microcensus. There were 18 brackets from 1989 to 1991 and 24 brackets in 2000 and 
2001. Thus this variable was converted into a continuous variable by taking the average 
of the interval endpoints. Finally, all income measures were deflated using the CPI. From 
Table 4.a., it seems that the native fathers have higher income levels compared to 
immigrant fathers regardless of having children or not. Further, both native and 
immigrant men with children 5 years of age or older have the highest levels of income 
among all groups, although their average age is less than for men without children. 
Similarly, from Table 4.b., it appears that although the native sons earn more than the 
second generation immigrants in all age groups; the income gap is relatively small 
particularly for individuals in the 20-33 age range.  
As an alternative, I construct adjusted earnings by regressing log monthly income 
on nationality dummies, state dummies, age and age-squared interacted with nationality 
for the immigrants.  The reason for including the interaction terms is to control for 
differences in age-earnings profiles across different nationalities. I then calculate 
  16predicted income for immigrant fathers that report employment as their main source of 
income by using the means of the demographic variables of each nation. Likewise, for the 
second generation sons, I construct adjusted income by regressing income on the same 
covariates by using sample means of corresponding variables from 2000 to 2004 
censuses. The average adjusted income is again higher for both native fathers and sons. 
Note, however, that the income gap diminishes between native and immigrant sons 
considerably after the adjustment.  
The percentage of immigrants who are fulltime workers varies considerably 
across different countries of origin. Table 5 displays the percentage of full-time working 
male immigrants for 20 different nationality groups. Turks constitute around 40% of the 
entire immigrant population in all different specifications, except for the first generation 
immigrants without children. The other “guest worker” countries, Ex-Yugoslavia, Italy, 
Greece, and Spain follow Turkey in terms of percentages.  
As a final point, the Microcensus data also provides information on the highest 
secondary school degree acquired, and information related to the type of vocational 
training that the individual attended. These two variables allow us to construct the years 
of education variable that is comparable to the years of education variable in GSOEP 
data. Tables 4.a. and 4.b. illustrate that the second generation is less likely to complete 
the basic academic route, Hauptschule, relative to their fathers and the average years of 
schooling increases for the second generation in all age ranges. Detailed information on 
the construction of the education variable is presented in the Appendix.  
 
 
  175. Results on Intergenerational Earnings Mobility 
 
5.a. Earnings Elasticity 
             To explore intergenerational elasticity of earnings, I used the log annual earnings 
for the previous year and the current monthly earnings from the GSOEP.  Annual labor 
earnings include wages and salary from all employment including training, primary and 
secondary jobs, and self-employment, plus income from bonuses, overtime, and profit 
sharing. I eliminate observations if an individual goes to school or gets training in all 
years. I work with the natural logarithm of earnings to correct for the non-normality of 
the earning distribution and to decrease the influence of outliers.  
             In this paper, I used individuals who worked full-time and have positive annual 
income for at least one year. Also, I disregard earnings while in school, vocational 
training, or maternity leave. Vocational training pays low and regulated wages which are 
not suitable measures for long-run status. I exclude yearly observations for which yearly 
earnings are non-positive or missing from the analysis, as is commonly done in most of 
the existing studies.  
              First, I estimate equation (2) by using log yearly income in order to consider 
fathers and sons at similar stages in their life-cycles. Then, I obtained residuals and take 
multi-year average of residuals in order to get a closer measure of permanent income and 
to take away the transitory component of earnings. Annual earnings for the sons are 
averaged over the five survey years from 2000 to 2004, while annual earnings for the 
fathers are averaged over six-years from 1984 to 1989. I assume that both fathers’ and 
sons’ transitory error components follow AR (1) process. Averaging son’s income and 
  18father’s income should improve the ratio of signal to total variance, and this will reduce 
the error in variables bias. Most previous research uses single year of sons’ income and 
multiple year of fathers’ income to correct this bias. However, if fathers’ transitory 
components and sons’ transitory components are correlated, measurement error in the 
sons permanent income measure will also introduce biases in the elasticity estimates.   
              For  Germany,  if  we  use  single year of sons’ income and 6 year average of 
fathers’ income then estimates of β range from 0.17 to 0.31 for natives and 0.15 to 0.34 
for immigrants and most of the estimations are insignificant for immigrants.
7 So using 
single year to proxy for sons’ permanent status can give misleading results. The estimates 
using multi-year averages for both fathers and sons, shown in Table 6, are 0.20 for 
natives and 0.23 for immigrants and they are both significant.  
In addition, estimates of permanent earnings will suffer from measurement error if 
the sample contains individuals who have reported earnings only for a small number of 
years. To eliminate this problem, I increase the minimum number of years for which 
individuals have valid earnings information to be included in the sample. I construct sub-
samples with individuals who worked full-time for more than 3 years, 4 years and so on. 
The second column in table 6 shows estimates with the sub-sample of individuals who 
have positive income for at least 3 years. The reduction in the downward bias through 
measurement error is dramatic, especially for immigrants. For the native father-son pairs 
elasticity increases from 0.21 to 0.25, whereas for the immigrant father-son pairs the 
increase is more striking, from 0.23 to 0.37. The estimations are very similar with the 
sub-sample of father-son pairs who worked more than 4 years, and more than 5 years.  
These results show less mobility for immigrants than for natives.  In particular, the results 
                                                 
7 Results can be shown upon request. 
  19suggest that an immigrant son is 13% as likely to have the same income as his 
grandfather, while a native son is 6% as likely to have the same income as his 
grandfather.   
              However, as discussed below, these estimates of mobility could still be biased 
because individual mobility may depend not only on the parents’ socio-economic status 
but also on the socio-economic status of those around them, including neighbors and 
people that one usually interacts with. This is particularly important for immigrants who 
often grow up in ethnic enclaves and are heavily influenced by those in their ethnic 
groups (Borjas 1992, 1995).In the next section, I include the socio-economic status of 
those in one’s ethnic group to see how these “ethnic capital” affects the socio-economic 
status of immigrant sons. 
 
5.b. Ethnic Capital 
Estimates of the Impact of Ethnic Capital using the GSOEP 
The OLS regression of second generation immigrants’ earnings on parental 
earnings might substantially underestimate the intensity of the true linkage in earnings 
across generations, even in the absence of measurement error. Table 7 presents the 
estimation results for the regressions of children's log annual income on parent's log 
annual income as well as the ethnic capital variable. Ethnic capital in these regressions is 
defined as the average of log income for each nationality measured by including not only 
fathers in father-son pairs but also all working men in the original GSOEP data.  Table 7 
shows the estimated coefficient of persistence that can be attributed to fathers’ status, β1, 
and falls slightly from 0.37 to 0.35 after controlling for ethnic capital. At the same time, it 
  20seems that ethnic capital is one of the essential determinants of children's income since 
the estimated coefficient of ethnic capital variable, β2, in children’s income equation is 
0.81.                                                                                                         
 Consequently, we can conclude that ethnic capital plays an important role in 
determining the skills of the next generation in Germany.  As a result, the degree of 
immobility, which is the sum of “parental capital”, 0.35, and ethnic capital, 0.81, is not 
statistically different from 1.  This implies complete immobility of immigrants as a group 
relative to natives in Germany, although individual immigrants may be doing better than 
their fathers.  Compared to U.S. studies which look at the role of parental and ethnic 
capital together (Borjas, 1992, 1995), these estimates suggest much less mobility for 
immigrants in Germany than in the U.S., where there is convergence of immigrant 
earnings. As noted below, this is also the immobility rate I find when using census data in 
the following section. 
 
Estimates of the Impact of Ethnic Capital using the Micro-Census 
              An analysis of the generational mobility of immigrants using detailed country of 
origin along these lines is also offered in Borjas (1993) and Card, DiNardo and Estes 
(2000). I define first generation immigrants as those who immigrated to Germany 
regardless of the age of arrival. For the most part, I follow Card, DiNardo and Estes 
(2000). I define second generation immigrants to be those born in Germany born but who 
are not German nationals and those who migrate to Germany before 6 years of age. 
Immigrant fathers are drawn from the 1989 and 1991 censuses and restricted to those 
individuals who have children between the ages of 5 and 18 years. Using regression 
  21analysis, average values of Yoj are calculated for each country of origin for individuals 
matching these criteria. Correspondingly, second generation immigrants consist of non-
German individuals between 16 and 34 years of age (corresponding to children who were 
between 5 and 18 in the 1989 to 1991 Censuses)  in any of the censuses in 2000 to 2004. 
Average values of Y1j are calculated for each country for respondents who report their 
own and their fathers’ nationality. 
              For  immigrant  fathers,  we constructed adjusted earnings by regressing log 
monthly income on country of nationality dummies, state dummies, age and age-squared 
interacted with dummies for country of nationality.  The reason to include the interaction 
terms is to control for differences in age-earnings profiles across countries of origin. We 
then calculate predicted income by using the means of the demographic variables of each 
nation and generation observed in the sample. I include all natives, first and second 
generation male immigrants, who report that their main income source comes from work. 
For the second generation sons, we constructed adjusted income by regressing on to the 
same variables but calculate the predicted income for means of variables from the sample 
of 2000 to 2004 Censuses.  
              Table  8  presents  estimates of equation (6) using least squares for different 
samples. They differ according to the age of these individuals, and according to the age 
and family characteristics of their potential fathers who are drawn from the 1989 and 
1991 Censuses. The first row uses a sample selection rule as similar as possible to that 
used by Card, DiNardo and Estes (2000). This is the broadest possible definition of 
second generation immigrants and their potential fathers. For possible fathers, I use all 
working males between 25 and 65 years and who have children from the 1989 and 1991 
  22Censuses. For possible immigrant sons, I used all working males between 20 and 45 
years old and who have non-German nationality in the 2000 to 2004 annual Censuses. 
The sons’ predicted earnings at the mean of characteristics are the outcome of interest. 
Card, DiNardo and Estes (2000, table 6.7) report an elasticity of 0.44 for a fathers in 1940 
and sons in 1970, and 0.62 for fathers in 1970 and sons in 1995. As they note, these are in 
the range of reported estimates for the general US population. By contrast, I find an 
elasticity of 1.12 for Germany, which is substantially higher than the one found for the 
U.S. using a similar sample. In row 2, I report results from a narrower sample, where the 
ages of sons is narrowed to include only 20 to 33 years olds from the 2000 to 2004 
Censuses and who are potential fathers as they  have children between 5 and 18 years of 
age in the 1989 through 1991 Censuses. The reason for narrowing down the group is that 
Censuses which have only 15 years differences between each other are available for 
estimations. This sample offers the greatest possibility of linking adult sons with their 
potential fathers. However, there may still be a disconnect between fathers and sons in 
this sample if some immigrants and their families in the 1989 or 1991 sample left the 
country before 2000 or sons already left home before 18 years old. The estimate of β 
obtained with this sample is 0.88, suggesting that the point estimates from the broader 
sample in row 1 likely overestimates the persistence rate.  When I narrow farther the 
sample to sons older than 25, the persistence rate is even lower at 0.73.Figure 1 presents a 
scatter plot of the 20 data points and the adjusted log annual income of second generation 
sons against the adjusted log income of first generation immigrant men. Like the 
estimation results, inspection of this figure suggests strong links between the earnings of 
immigrant fathers and the outcomes of their children. 
  23Comparison with Results from other Studies 
              There are numerous reviews
8 summarizing the cross-country comparisons of the 
degree of generational earnings mobility. In these studies, the results may substantially 
differ between and within countries due to a number of reasons. Differences in data and 
methodologies are likely to account for most of the variation. First, the age of sons and 
parents at which incomes are obtained and measure of permanent income used (e.g., 
annual income, monthly wage, hourly wage, or total family income) differ across studies. 
Table 9 shows the results on the earnings elasticity for different countries from other 
studies which use the same estimation method and similar selection methods to my paper. 
Most of the studies show that around 40% of parental earnings advantage passes on to the 
children in U.S. One exception for this is Couch and Dunn (1997). By using similar 
selection rules for sons and fathers, they find an income persistence rate of 0.13 for the 
U.S. and 0.11 for Germany. This persistence rate for Germany is very similar to estimates 
by Grawe (2004) and Lillard (2001). Similarly, for Scandinavian countries, the 
persistence rate varies between 0.10 and 0.20, whereas, for Canada and UK, it is 
estimated to be 0.20.  
As noted above, my analysis estimates persistence rates of 0.25 and 0.37 for 
natives and immigrants, respectively. This result is considerably higher than most of the 
estimates for Germany found in previous studies, and slightly lower than U.S. estimates 
for natives. The reasons for this difference are twofold. First, as stated earlier, the sons’ 
average age in my sample is mid-thirties, so my sample of sons is older than those used in 
previous studies of intergenerational mobility in Germany. Second, previous studies 
examine intergenerational mobility in Germany using current monthly income, whereas I 
                                                 
8 Solon (2002,1999), Mayer (2002), Jencks (2004), Corak (2006) 
  24use annual labor income to obtain permanent income. Using an older sample of sons is 
preferable because it captures sons at stages closer in their careers to their fathers.  Also, 
using annual income rather than monthly income gives a measure that is closer to 
permanent income, as monthly income may be subject to transitory shocks. Both of these 
contribute to reducing problems with measurement error and obtaining more accurate 
result. 
 
6. Channels of Intergenerational Transmission of Inequality 
 
              Socio-economic status can be passed on from generation to generation through a 
number of channels.  The most obvious channel through which parents affect their 
children’s income potential is through their educational attainment.  Parents with greater 
educational attainment may devote more time to their children’s education if a 
substitution effect dominates but less time if an income effect dominates.  Also, the 
educational attainment of those in one’s reference group may affect one’s educational 
attainment by increasing resources and by changing one’s expectations of the returns to 
education.  However, there are also other channels through which socio-economic status 
will be passed on.  In particular, a regressive tax system will help to perpetuate the 
structure of inequality, but a progressive tax system will, on the contrary, provide greater 
mobility.  The more progressive tax system in Germany may help to explain the greater 
mobility in Germany with respect to parental income.  Finally, intergenerational mobility 
may be reduced if jobs are passed on through networks within occupations or through 
unions.  In this case, not only the probability of getting a job but also the quality of jobs 
  25will be passed on from parents to children.  In what follows, I explore the importance of 
these various channels in determining income persistence in Germany. 
 
6.a. Education 
I begin by considering the intergenerational transmission of education, to gauge 
the importance of education in determining income persistence across generations.   
However, to understand the intergenerational transmission of education better, it is 
important to first describe the German educational system. In Germany, children usually 
begin school in the year after they become six and attend a four year primary school. 
After they finish the fourth grade, the German education system channels students into 
three types of secondary schools, which differ  in terms of academic content. The lowest 
level or basic route of secondary school (Hauptschule), intends to give students a school-
leaving certificate after grade 8 or 9. The main scope of this type of secondary schools is 
basically to equip students with some vocational skills and prepare them for an 
apprenticeship. The second type of secondary school, the middle level (Realschule) ends 
after grade 10 and is much more academically oriented than the basic school. In the 
middle level students also enter an apprenticeship or a school based vocational training 
after finishing school. And the last type of secondary schools is the Gymnasium, which 
has the highest academic level among the three. The Gymnasium prepares students for 
the university entrance exam (Abitur) after grade 13 or gives them a chance to take a 
lower level qualification after grade 12, called Fachhochschulreife, which allows school 
leavers to attend a polytechnic. 
  26              Students in the different secondary schools will attend different types of high 
schools and colleges on the basis of their route initiated at the end of grade four. The 
basic difference between the German and American education systems lies in the concept 
of this initial placement. The student is placed in one of these three types of schools and 
this placement tends to be permanent, and the mobility, basically the upward mobility is 
very rare (Pischke, 1999). The decision of the type of secondary school bases on the 
different factors such as formal exams, primary school grades, recommendations by the 
primary school teacher, and parental choice. The selection process might differ between 
states and over time.  
              Table10 shows the results for the regression of the son's completed number of 
years of education on father's years of education. There is substantial evidence suggesting 
that the human capital of the parents is essential in determining the child’s human capital. 
The estimation results illustrate that approximately 47 percent and 30 percent of the 
parental human capital is transmitted to the child for the natives and the immigrants 
respectively.  Similarly, for the more constrained subset that includes only individuals 
with information on education for at least 3 years, I find that second generation natives 
inherit 49 percent of their parents’ education attainment, whereas second generation 
immigrants are more mobile in terms of years of schooling, since they only seem to 
inherit 34 percent of their parents’ human capital. These findings coincide with what one 
may expect for Germany, since the public education system in Germany provides less 
expensive and of more equal quality of education is provided to individuals in all income 
groups. To offer equal educational opportunities to everyone, the poor families are 
subsidized by the combination of taxes and educational transfer revenues taken from high 
  27income families. This feature of the German education system enables children of the less 
advantageous group to get better education opportunities and therefore, is expected to 
generate more upward mobility than the U.S. education system.. 
              Note, however, that although second generation immigrants are more mobile in 
terms of their education, they continue to resemble income disadvantages of their parents. 
The reason for this puzzling result could be two-fold. First, even though it seems that the 
second generation immigrants are doing better than their parents in terms of education, it 
is worth to note that their completed years of schooling are less than that of native sons. 
According to GSOEP, it appears that second generation immigrants attain 10.82 years of 
schooling, 1.8 years more from that of their parents whereas second generation natives 
get 12.3 years of schooling or 0.8 more years than their parents. Also, the parallel results 
can be obtained by using Microcensus data. Thus, even though the immigrant sons are 
more upward mobile, they still remain behind in terms of completed years of education. 
Second, it is important to note that our analysis is based on the completed years of 
schooling and the potential differences in quality of education related to types of schools 
individuals attend would be a problem. Among the first generation immigrants, 65 
percent of the individuals complete only lowest level of high school, “Hauptschule”, 
compare to 51 percent for the corresponding native generation. However, the fraction of 
those who complete only Hauptschule decreases drastically to 18 percent for native sons, 
and to 35 percent for the second generation immigrants. 
  Contrary to the results on income mobility, immigrants appear to be more mobile 
than natives in terms of years of schooling. The correlation of years of schooling is 
around 0.5 for natives but 0.2 for immigrants. Therefore, as a conclusion, education 
  28cannot explain the higher persistence rate of income for immigrants' than for natives.  If 
anything, education appears to help in equalizing immigrants with natives. 
              I  would  like  to  find  out  the extent to which the effect of ethnic capital on 
intergenerational mobility is driving the education results. Thus, to see the effect of 
ethnic capital on education of immigrant children, I include ethnic capital as a control 
variable into education estimation. Table 7 presents, with the inclusion of ethnic capital, 
the coefficient on parental input changes slightly from 0.33 to 0.31. This finding suggests 
that ethnic capital is not significantly affecting children’s education. To control for the 
validity of this result, I also repeat the estimation using Microcensus data.  Table 8 
displays the estimation results for Microcensus data. From Table 8, it appears that the 
persistence rate is 0.33 when fathers who have children between 5 and 18 years old are 
used in estimations. The persistence rate is equal to the sum of parental and ethnic capital 
in the estimations using Microcensus data. Disentangling the persistence rate using 
GSOEP suggests that the parental capital is around 0.35 and ethnic capital is almost 
negligible in determining the child’s human capital.
9
 
6.b. Relative income position 
              Contrary to the previous section which analyzes gross income at the individual 
level, in this section I use gross and net income information calculated at the household 
                                                 
9 My results contrast with the results in previous studies. Couch and Dunn (1997) use GSOEP data 
and find that the intergenerational elasticity of education is 0.19 for Germany, which is considerably 
smaller than my estimates. However, Dustman (2005) finds a persistence rate of education of 0.42 for 
natives and around 0.10 but insignificant for immigrants. For the U.S., Borjas (1992, 1995) estimates a 
persistence rate of parental capital of 0.25 and of ethnic capital of 0.20, or an overall persistent rate of 0.45, 
which is higher than my estimates.   
 
  29level. Father’s earnings might not fully capture the economic resources of the family, 
particularly for low income fathers. The assumption underlying this approach is that all 
members of a specific household pool their resources and share the utility of a given 
household income. Consequently, information about the various income components of a 
specific household is ascribed to all members of that household, regardless of age or 
individual income performance. The sum of employment income, capital income, and 
private transfers represents gross household income. Adding old age pensions and public 
transfers, and subtracting taxes and social security contributions yields a measure of net 
household income. I deflate all income measures to Euro units in 2001 using price 
indices. In order to adjust for differences in household size and composition, I divide 
gross and net household income by the modified OECD equivalence scale-which gives 
weights of 1.0 to the head, 0.5 to other adult household members, and 0.3 to each child- 
to obtain individual before and after tax income. 
              I obtain total mean of population by multiplying weights and before (after) tax 
incomes of all individuals between 20 and 45 years old in the sample, and then by 
dividing with the sum of their weights .This weighted mean of before (after) tax income 
of population is equated to 100, then individual before (after) tax income is ranked 
relative to the mean for the total population in each year to obtain relative gross and net 
income. 
              Table 10 shows results for the regression of the relative gross and net income on 
father's relative gross and net income. In my estimations, I only used sons who no longer 
live with their parents. The estimation results for relative gross and net income illustrate 
that persistence rate is approximately 0.5 for immigrants while 0.3 for natives. These 
  30results suggest higher persistence for natives and immigrants once the son’s household 
income is considered rather than the individual income.  This probably has to do with 
assortative mating and the fact that son’s tend to marry people like them.  It is also 
interesting to contrast the results using gross vs. net income to try to get at the importance 
of the tax system.  Comparisons for natives do not seem to show significant differences, 
but results for immigrants suggest lower persistence when net income is considered rather 
than gross income.  This suggests that the tax system in Germany appears to help 




              GSOEP provides information on father’s occupation when sons were aged 15, 
and publishes an index of occupational prestige computed according to the technique 
proposed by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996). The Treiman standard international 
occupational prestige score varies from 13 to 78. Larger values indicate higher 
occupational prestige, and it is highly correlated with earnings. There are three 
measurement problems with the occupational prestige measure. First, we only have one 
observation on (when the child was aged 14 or 15); second one, the data of parents are 
obtained from adult children and not from the parents themselves; and finally, a 
misclassification error may arise when a new occupation is observed or an old occupation 
disappears. 
              Table 10 also shows the results for the regression of occupation index on father's 
occupation index. The estimation results illustrate that persistence rate is approximately 
  310.2 for natives which is very close to the income persistence rate as expected, and for 
immigrants persistence rate is close  to zero but insignificant, and the number of 




This study credibly documented that the extent of the intergenerational mobility 
in terms of permanent income is less for immigrants from that of natives in Germany. 
Using both GSOEP, a long panel that over-samples immigrants, and German 
Microcensus data reveal that although the immigrant sons may be doing better than their 
fathers, they are still more inclined to inherit the income disadvantage of their families 
compared to natives. Alternatively, it is likely that the family income constructed by only 
using father’s earnings might underestimate the potential sources of the entire family. 
Therefore, gross and net income provided at the household level may reflect the extent of 
intergenerational mobility more precisely. I find evidence suggesting that for the relative 
gross and net income status, the immigrant sons tend to perpetuate their fathers’ status 
relative to native sons as well. Note however that, these results suggest higher persistence 
for natives and immigrants once the son’s household income is considered rather than the 
individual income. 
    As stated in Borjas (1992, 1995), the OLS regression of second generation 
immigrants’ earnings on parental earnings might substantially underestimate the intensity 
of the true linkage in earnings across generations. Thus, not only the parents’ socio-
economic status but also the ethnic environment those parents reside in as well as the 
language, culture and norms of the ethnic enclave in which the children are raised would 
  32potentially impact the extent of the intergenerational mobility of immigrant generations. 
Consequently, inclusion of ethnic capital suggests that ethnic capital plays an important 
role in determining the skills of the next generation in Germany. The persistence rate 
which compromise of parental capital and ethnic capital reveals that the immigrant 
generations in Germany are almost immobile as a group relative to natives in Germany in 
terms of permanent income. Hence, the persistence rate is not statistically different from 
unity for immigrants. Compared to U.S. studies which look at the role of parental and 
ethnic capital together (Borjas, 1992, 1995), the findings that also include ethnic capital 
imply much less mobility for immigrants in Germany than in the U.S., thus divergence of 
immigrant earnings in Germany rather than convergence. 
The investigation of the channels that might potentially help immigrant sons to 
catch up to natives enhances our understanding of intergenerational mobility in Germany. 
The most obvious channel through which parents impact their children’s income potential 
is through their educational attainment. It appears that even though the immigrants are 
less mobile relative to natives in terms of income, immigrant sons are less likely to inherit 
their fathers’ educational attainment compared to the native second generation. This 
result suggests that if anything else, education definitely offers opportunities to 
immigrant sons to overcome their parents’ disadvantaged status and to attain comparable 
levels of earnings as natives. The other potential channel worth mentioning is the 
progressive tax system in Germany, since the more progressive tax system in Germany 
may provide less income inequality between natives and different ethnic groups. The 
comparison of gross versus net relative income for natives do not seem to show 
significant differences, but results for immigrants reveals lower persistence when net 
  33income is considered rather than gross income.  This suggests that the tax system in 
Germany appears to help immigrants in equalizing their status relative to natives. Finally, 
intergenerational mobility may be reduced if jobs are passed on through networks within 
occupations or through unions.  In this case, not only the probability of getting a job but 
also the quality of jobs will be passed on from parents to children for natives. 
              These results suggest that in spite of the more egalitarian and less expensive 
structure of the German education system as well as more progressive German tax 
scheme, it seems that immigrant generations are “stuck” in their neighborhoods and they 
are far away from moving with natives. These findings reveal that channels other than 
education and tax system should be considered to improve permanent status of 

































              DIW Berlin, the German Economic Institute, administers the GSOEP. It is a 
longitudinal database that started in 1984 with a sample of about 4,528 households with 
12,245 respondents, 3,000 of whom were guest workers from Turkey, Italy, the former 
Yugoslavia, Spain and Greece. The samples of the GSOEP were expanded in several 
years.  The first two expansions occurred after unification, when the survey was extended 
to East Germans and immigrants from other countries, especially ethnic Germans (4,453 
new respondents in 1990) and when East Europeans were included to the database in 
1995 (1,078 new respondents). Moreover, in 1998, a new sample was selected from the 
population of private households in Germany. In 2004, the last year for which the data is 
available, the GSOEP contained information on 22,019 people living in 11,803 
households.  
              In the GSOEP, interviewers do face-to-face interviews with all members of a 
given survey household aged 16 years and over. Thus, there are no proxy interviews for 
adult household members. The reduction in the population size for all individual samples 
is mainly the result of person-level dropouts, refusals, moving abroad, etc. However, the 
sample size increases because of new persons moving into already existing households 
and children reaching the minimum respondent’s age of 16. Also, a person is followed up 
even after moving out of the household. Thus, this allows us to establish links even when 
they do not live in the same household any more. 
The annual labor earnings examined in Table 1 include wages and salary from all 
employment including training, primary and secondary jobs, and self-employment, plus 
  35income from bonuses overtime particularly 13th month pay, 14th month pay, Christmas 
bonus pay, holiday bonus pay, miscellaneous bonus pay and profit sharing. 
 
2. Micro Census Data 
              The  1%  Microcensus  is  a large, representative sample of the population 
containing demographic information and labor market data. It is a random sample where 
all households have the same probability to be selected. Out of the whole country, certain 
regions are chosen, and all households and persons get interviewed in this region. In total 
approximately 370,000 households with 820,000 people are interviewed in the 2004 
Microcensus. Additionally, the 2004 Microcensus   contains information for 160,000 
people of about 70,000 households who live in the new states and East Berlin.  
              The Microcensus was conducted once a year until 2004 and it is generally in the 
form of face-to-face interview of respondents by an interviewer. A quarter of all 
households in the sample get replaced every year. Consequently, each household stays in 
the sample for 4 years. In addition, the response rate in the Microcensus is regularly very 
high, almost 98 percent. In particular, the information associated with employment, 
applies to the defined reference week, which usually described as the last week of April 
without any holiday. Accordingly, employed persons are all those who are 15 and older 
and who have worked at least one hour in the reference week.  
              I use subsample of Microcensus, Microcensus Scientific Use File, which is a 
subsample of the Microcensus available for use by researchers. Microcensus Scientific 
Use File is a 70% subsample of the original Microcensus that anonymizes all 
  36individuals.  This factually anonymized subsample was drawn as a systematically random 
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  40TABLE 1:Descriptive Statistics for Natives and Immigrants by using GSOEP 
 Fathers    Sons 
Variable Native Immigrants   Native Immigrants
         
Age  44.63 45.81    30.82 30.88 
  (9.15) (8.49)   (7.18) (7.30) 
         
Years of Schooling  11.39  9.05    12.26  10.82 
  (2.32) (1.90)   (2.73) (2.23) 
         
Log(yearly  income)  10.28 10.04    10.04 10.03 
  (0.44) (0.29)   (0.79) (0.65) 
         
Hourly  Wage  16.57 12.92    12.81 12.05 
 (12.40) (6.01)    (7.55)  (6.15) 
         
Occupational  Index  42.75 33.61    43.90 38.28 
 (12.82) (9.06)    (11.74) (9.72) 
         
Relative Gross Income  95.26  78.49    117.39  95.14 
 (45.98) (29.83)    (58.69) (55.05) 
         
Relative Net Income  94.27  77.10    108.06  91.45 
 (35.33) (22.74)    (42.37) (39.72) 
         
N  518 207    647 269 
Note: Fathers are from 1984-1989 GSOEP; Sons' are from 2000-2004 GSOEP. Standard deviations are reported in 
parentheses. Earnings are deflated using the CPI and expressed in 2001 Euros. All individuals are at least one year 
full time worker. Immigrants refer to people who have nationality other than German. Occupational index is 
Treiman indices varies from 13 to 78 
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TABLE 2: Distribution of Fathers by Number of Sons 
 natives    Immigrants 
Number of Sons Number Percent   Number Percent
1  408 78.72    156 77.66 
2  95 18.38    41 18.21 
3 13  2.51    9  3.78 
4  1 0.19    1 0.34 
5 0  0       
6 1  0.19       
Total # of Sons  647  100    269  100 
Total # of Fathers  518       207    













TABLE 3:Distribution of Fathers and Sons by Number of Years with Positive Annual Labor Income 
 Fathers    Sons 
  Natives Immigrants   Natives Immigrants
Number of Years Number Percent Number Percent   Number Percent Number Percent
1 1  0.19  0  0    99  15.3  50  18.59 
2  4  0.77  5  2.4    81 12.52 48 17.84 
3  13  2.51  3  1.44    90 13.91 37 13.75 
4 7  1.35  3  1.44    100  15.46  42  15.61 
5  15  2.9  14 6.73    277  42.81  92 34.2 
6  477 92.26 183 87.98           
Total # of Individuals  518     207       647     269    
Note: First column illustrates number of years which intervals can report positive annual income. For fathers there are 6 possible years between 1984 









  42TABLE 4a: Characteristics of  Natives and First Generation Immigrants using Microcensus 
  1989-1991 censuses 
 
Without children    With children    with children age btw 
5-18 
Variables Natives 1stGen   Natives 1stGen   Natives 1stGen
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Fraction  of  Population  0.43 0.02   0.51 0.04   0.24  0.02 
Mean  Age  46.06 42.38   41.75 40.80   41.24  41.71 
Mean  Educ.  Year  11.72 11.37   11.79 10.78   11.94  10.67 
Fraction  “Hauptschule”  0.49 0.55   0.53 0.63   0.51  0.65 
Fraction  of  Worker  0.69 0.73   0.87 0.84   0.93  0.86 
Hours  Worked  in  Week  41.40 40.70   42.30 40.40   42.88  40.67 
Income  1,228.00 1,064.03  1,433.60 1,229.80  1,571.20  1,332.80 
Adjusted  Income  1,401.20 1,252.90  1,598.16 1,398.80  1,624.20  1,374.60 
N  106,139  5,656     128,256  8,739     59,343  5,844 
Notes: : Each sample consist of males between 25 and 65 years old drawn from 1989 and 1991 Microcensus. Earnings are deflated 
using the CPI and expressed in 2001 Euros. Immigrants refer to people who have nationality other than German. Hours worked and 
income variable is only for men who report the employment payments as the main source of income and work at least 30 weeks per 
year and 30 hours per week. Adjusted income constructed by regressing log monthly income on nationality dummies, state dummies, 








TABLE 4b: Characteristics of  Natives and Second Generation Immigrants using Microcensus  
  2001-04 census 
  age 20-45   age 20-33   age 25-33
Variables Natives 2ndGen.   Natives 2ndGen.   Natives 2ndGen.
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Fraction of Population  0.58  0.01    0.26  0.01    0.16  0.01 
Mean Age  33.70  28.20    26.71  25.84    29.32  28.50 
Mean Educ. Year  12.80  12.14    12.67  12.02    12.94  12.24 
Fraction “Hauptschule”  0.22  0.35    0.18  0.35    0.20  0.36 
Fraction of Worker  0.78  0.68    0.70  0.64    0.77  0.71 
Hours Worked in Week  41.72  40.75    40.86  40.18    41.31  40.71 
Income 1,892.20  1,590.11    1,497.67  1,452.33    1,702.23  1,654.59 
Adjusted Income  1,814.98  1,794.81    1,810.90  1,825.29    1,808.11  1,778.64 
N  324,015  7308     145,628  5,831     94,065  3,478 
Notes: Each sample consist of males drawn from 2000 to 2004 annual Microcensus. Earnings are deflated using the CPI and expressed 
in 2001 Euros."2nd gen." refers to second generation immigrants those who born in Germany or migrate younger than 6 years old and 
who have nationality other than German. Hours worked and income variable is only for men who report the employment payments as 
the main source of income and work at least 30 weeks per year and 30 hours per week. Adjusted income constructed by regressing log 
monthly income on nationality dummies, state dummies, age and age-squared interacted with nationality for the immigrants. 







  43TABLE 5: Percentages of Working Male Immigrants by Country of Origin 
  1989-91 census  2001-2004 census 
  1st gen.    2nd gen. 
Countries Without With With age 5-18 Age 20-45 Age 20-33 Age 25-33
 (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
France 1.76  0.94  0.85    1.25  1.11  1.17 
Greece 5.37  7.8  6.81   8.2  7.34  8.66 
Great Britain  3.53  1.45  1.26    1.33  0.82  1.09 
Italy 14.53  14.34  13.59    17.28  16.47  17.27 
Ex-Yugoslavia 20.23  13.25  14.89    11.51  13.23  11.67 
Italy 2.1  1.02  0.77    2.71  1.45  1.57 
Austria 5.49  3.02  2.64    3.35  2.11  2.62 
Poland 2.59  1.66  1.48    0.9  0.63  0.56 
Portugal 1.69  2.07  1.8    1.97  1.9  2.01 
Spain 3.53  3.35  3.37    3.7  2.9  3.5 
Turkey 20.59  37.78  40.15    37.81  44.27  42.31 
USA 2.56  1.43  1.1    1.49  0.79  0.72 
Remaining EU  0.75  0.32  0.3    1.04  0.69  0.93 
Other Europe  2.34  1.9  1.99    3.03  2.53  2.38 
Morocco 0.58  0.61  0.71    0.8  0.95  0.89 
Other Africa  0.82  0.81  0.65    0.66  0.45  0.28 
Iran 0.65  0.57  0.45    0.48  0.4  0.36 
Middle East  0.36  0.43  0.39    0.42  0.4  0.32 
Vietnam 0.46  0.3  0.16    0.2  0.11  0.08 
South East Asia  0.82  0.78  0.67    0.3  0.21  0.12 
Remaining world  9.23  6.18  5.96    1.57  1.24  1.49 
              
TOTAL 4137  7427  5069      4978  3788  2484 
Notes:"1st gen" refers to first generation full time working male immigrants between 25 and 65 years old drawn from 1989 and 
1991 Microcensus "2nd gen." refers to second generation full time working male immigrants drawn from 2000 to 2004 annual 
Microcensus. Full time workers are defined as individuals who report their employment payments as the main source of income 
and work at least 30 weeks per year and 30 hours per week. "With" refers to first generation immigrants who have children, 
"Without" refers to first generation immigrants who do not have child, and "With age 5-18" refers to first generation immigrants 
who have children between 5 and 18 years old residing in their family in 1989 or 1991. The second generation full time working 


















  44TABLE 6: Intergenerational Earning Elasticity Estimates             
  At least 1 year    More than 3 year     Eldest Son 
  Natives Immigrants   Natives Immigrants   Natives Immigrants
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
                
log(annual  income) 0.207***  0.228    0.256*** 0.372***   0.193*** 0.404*** 
 (0.072)  (0.145)    (0.06)  (0.136)    (0.066)  (0.15) 
 647  269    467  171    383  136 
                
log(current income)  0.188***  0.169    0.227***  0.286***    0.187***  0.328*** 
 (0.051)  (0.112)    (0.052)  (0.102)    (0.056)  (0.121) 
N  636  261     465  168     381  133 
Note: Robust standard errors from clustering by family are shown in parentheses. Asterisk denote significance levels ( * <0.1, ** 
<0.05, *** <0.01). Earnings are deflated using the CPI and expressed in 2001 Euros.  Non-positive or missing incomes are excluded. 
Previous annual income and current monthly income used in the estimations are over the five survey years from 2000 to 2004 of the 
son’s report, and six years of father’s report from 1984 to 1989.  Fathers’ and Sons’ transitory error components follow AR (1) 
process.  "at least 1 year" refers to all individuals report positive income at least one year. "more than 3 year" refers to all individuals 
report positive income three years or more. "Eldest son” refers that only eldest sons are used in estimations if the family have more 
than one son who report positive income at least three years. 
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TABLE 7: Intergenerational Parental and Ethnic Capital Estimates using GSOEP 
Outcome With Siblings   Without Siblings
 (1)    (2)
log(annual income)     
Parental Capital   0.352    0.387 
       (0.03)***          (0.047)*** 
Ethnic Capital   0.819    0.617 
      (0.11)***           (0.122)*** 
education     
Parental Capital   0.31    0.29 
        (0.02)***      (0.037) 
Ethnic Capital   0.26    0.219 
   (0.48)      (0.511) 
log(hourly wage)     
Parental Capital   0.2    0.233 
          (0.05)***         (0.083)** 
Ethnic Capital   1.05    0.86 
        (0.32)**          (0.339)** 
Note: Robust standard errors from clustering by family are shown in parentheses. Asterisk denote significance levels 
( * <0.1, ** <0.05, *** <0.01). Earnings are deflated using the CPI and expressed in 2001 Euros.  Non-positive or 
missing incomes are excluded. Outcomes used in the estimations are over the five survey years from 2000 to 2004 of 
the son’s report, and six years of father’s report from 1984 to 1989.  Fathers’ and Sons’ transitory error components 
follow AR (1) process.  "With brother" refers to all sons who report outcome at least three years used in estimations. 
"Without brother" refers to only eldest son who report outcome at least three years used in estimations. Education is 
years of schooling. "Ethnic capital" is defined as the average of outcome for each nationality measured by including 
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Table 8: Least Square estimates of Earnings and Education Elasticity using Microcensus 
          
Outcome Sample selection rules    Results 
  Fathers Sons   Slope R2
log (monthly earning)           
 with  children  age  25-45    1.12  0.68 
       (0.18)   
  with children 5 to 18 years  age 20-33    0.86  0.49 
       (0.20)   
  with children 10 to 18 years  age 25-33    0.73  0.54 
       (0.16)   
years of son's education          
 with  children  age  25-45    0.42  0.67 
       (0.06)   
  with children 5 to 18 years  age 20-33    0.33  0.49 
       (0.07)   
  with children 10 to 18 years  age 25-33    0.39  0.33 
            (0.07)    
Notes: Fathers consist of males between 25 and 65 years old drawn from 1989 and 1991 Microcensus. Sons consist of males 
drawn from 2000 to 2004 annual Microcensus. Earnings are deflated using the CPI and expressed in 2001 Euros. The monthly 
earnings are constructed by regressing log monthly income of full time working natives, first and second generation immigrants 
on nationality dummies, state dummies, age and age-squared interacted with nationality for the immigrants, then predicted 
income is obtained by using the means of the demographic variables of each nation. The number of observation is 20, 
corresponding to the nationality of immigrants. Estimations are based on weighted least squares, with the number of sons from 
each group as the weight. Robust standard errors from clustering by nationality are shown in parentheses. All estimates are 
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TABLE 9: Estimates of Earning Elasticity           
Authors Countries Elasticity Average age or ranges Years
     Sons Fathers  
Solon (1992)  U.S.A.  0.39  25-33  44  5 
Zimmerman (1992)  U.S.A.  0.42    49.7  5 
Couch Dunn (1997)  U.S.A.  0.13  24.9  53  6 
Björklund & Jäntti (1997)  U.S.A.  0.39  28-36    3 
Mulligan (1997)  U.S.A.  0.33  23-37  40-45   
Grawe (2004)  U.S.A.  0.47  < 46  40.2  5 
Mazumder (2001)  U.S.A.  0.55  30-35  27-69  9 
Grawe (2004)  Canada  0.15      5 
Corak (2001)  Canada  0.26  32-35    5 
Österbacka (2003)  Finland  0.08  30.2  45.8  5 
Couch Dunn (1997)  Germany  0.11  22.8  51  6 
Grawe (2004)  Germany  0.09    47.5  5 
Lillard(2001) Germany  0.11  25  52  <14 
Bratberg,et al (2003)  Norway  0.12  30-34  48  3 
Osterberg (2000)  Sweden  0.13  25-51  52  3 
Dearden et al. (1997)  U.K.  0.22  33  47.5    
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TABLE 10: Intergenerational Earning Elasticity Estimates 
  At least 1 year    More than 3 year     Eldest son 
Outcome Natives Immigrants   Natives Immigrants   Natives Immigrants
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
                
Years of Schooling  0.467***  0.303***    0.489***  0.335***    0.528***  0.324*** 
 (0.049)  (0.093)    (0.058)  (0.112)    (0.058)  (0.123) 
 618  252    449  165    368  132 
                
Occupational Indices  0.170***  0.024    0.192***  0.038    0.218***  0.096 
 (0.056)  (0.087)    (0.06)  (0.09)    (0.069)  (0.092) 
 285  196    200  125    162  97 
                
Relative Gross Income  0.332***  0.414***    0.297***  0.521***    0.277***  0.499*** 
 (0.084)  (0.138)    (0.064)  (0.166)    (0.068)  (0.18) 
 647  269    467  171    383  136 
                
Relative Net Income  0.275***  0.403***    0.312***  0.508***    0.272***    0.537*** 
 (0.084)  (0.143)    (0.075)  (0.172)    (0.081)  (0.199) 
 647  269    467  171    383  136 
                
Annual Labor Income  0.177**  0.344*    0.255***  0.368*    0.225***   0.410* 
 (0.069)  (0.192)    (0.059)  (0.193)    (0.063)  (0.217) 
 647  269    467  171    383  136 
Note: Robust standard errors from clustering by family are shown in parentheses. Asterisk denote significance levels ( * <0.1, ** <0.05, *** <0.01). 
Earnings are deflated using the CPI and expressed in 2001 Euros.  Non-positive or missing incomes are excluded. Outcomes used in the estimations 
are over the five survey years from 2000 to 2004 of the son’s report, and six years of father’s report from 1984 to 1989.  Fathers’ and Sons’ 
transitory error components follow AR (1) process.  "At least 1 year" refers to all individuals reporting outcome at least one year. "More than 3 year" 
refers to all individuals reporting outcome three years or more. "Eldest son” refers to the fact that only eldest sons are used in estimations if the 
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